This is a template. Every organisation name, figure, finding and date below is illustrative and written for this document. It is not a client report, not a redacted report, and describes no real assessment. Its purpose is to show the structure and evidentiary standard of an ACE IT Solutions deliverable before you commission one.
Assessment report · template
| Client | [Client legal entity] |
| Engagement reference | [SOW-YYYY-NNN] |
| Assessment window | [Start date] to [End date] |
| Frameworks referenced | SOX ITGC · ISO/IEC 27001:2022 · SOC 2 · NYDFS Part 500 · PCI DSS v4.0 |
| Prepared by | [Lead architect], ACE IT Solutions · reviewed by [Practice lead] |
| Classification | Client confidential — distribution list in Appendix B |
| Version | [1.0] · [Date] · superseding [n/a] |
We assessed identity and access controls across [n] in-scope applications, the corporate directory and the privileged access estate. Control design is sound in authentication and change management. The material exposure sits in the entitlement model: access is granted per application rather than per job function, which makes periodic review unreliable and leaves segregation-of-duties conflicts invisible at the point of request.
Of [n] findings, [n] are rated high, [n] medium and [n] low. Two of the high-rated findings are the documented root cause of prior-year audit observations, which means closing them addresses both this assessment and the open audit actions. None of the findings requires new platform procurement; all can be addressed with the tooling already licensed.
HIGH
[n]
MEDIUM
[n]
LOW
[n]
REPEAT
[n]
In scope: [list applications, directories, PAM platform, cloud tenancies and business units]. Assessment covered control design and, where records existed, operating effectiveness over the stated window.
Out of scope: [list exclusions and the reason for each]. Excluded systems are named so that neither party treats this report as broader assurance than it is.
Limitations: conclusions rest on the evidence provided during the window and on interviews with named control owners. Where a control could not be tested, the finding states so rather than inferring effectiveness. This assessment is not an audit, and it does not constitute an attestation or a certification opinion.
Document review, configuration inspection, entitlement extraction and analysis, control-owner interviews, and sample testing of [n] provisioning, [n] leaver and [n] privileged-elevation events. Findings were rated on impact and likelihood, then cross-checked against the framework references above and the prior-year observation register.
| RATING | DEFINITION | EXPECTED RESPONSE |
|---|---|---|
| High | Control absent or ineffective where failure would be reportable, or a repeat of a prior audit observation. | Remediation plan within 30 days; interim compensating control documented. |
| Medium | Control operates but evidence is incomplete, inconsistent or manually assembled. | Scheduled into the current or next quarter's plan with a named owner. |
| Low | Control effective; hygiene, efficiency or documentation improvement available. | Backlog item; no compensating control required. |
| CONTROL DOMAIN | CURRENT | TARGET | PRIMARY GAP |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authentication and MFA | [3] | [4] | Exception population not time-bound |
| Entitlement and role model | [1] | [4] | Application-level grants, no business-language roles |
| Joiner-mover-leaver | [2] | [4] | Leaver revocation depends on manual notification |
| Privileged access | [2] | [4] | Credentials vaulted but entitlements standing |
| Access review and certification | [2] | [4] | Reviewers cannot interpret what they approve |
| Segregation of duties | [1] | [3] | No ruleset enforced at request time |
| Non-human identities | [1] | [3] | No sponsor, expiry or rotation lifecycle |
| Logging and monitoring | [3] | [4] | Identity events not correlated with privileged sessions |
Maturity scale: 1 initial · 2 developing · 3 defined · 4 managed · 5 optimised. Target levels are agreed with the client, not imposed.
| REF | FINDING | RATING | FRAMEWORK REF | OWNER |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| F-01 | Entitlements granted per application, with no business-language role model | High | SOX ITGC · A.5.15 · CC6.1 | [Owner] |
| F-02 | Leaver revocation not triggered from the authoritative HR source | High | SOX ITGC · CC6.3 · 500.7 | [Owner] |
| F-03 | Standing privileged entitlements retained after credential vaulting | High | 500.7 · PCI Req. 7 · A.8.2 | [Owner] |
| F-04 | Segregation-of-duties conflicts detected only in periodic review, not at request | Medium | SOX ITGC · A.5.3 | [Owner] |
| F-05 | Service and application accounts without sponsor, expiry or rotation | Medium | PCI Req. 8.6 · A.5.16 | [Owner] |
| F-06 | MFA exceptions granted without expiry or compensating control record | Medium | 500.12 · PCI Req. 8 | [Owner] |
| F-07 | Privileged session records not retained for the period the framework expects | Low | PCI Req. 10 · A.8.15 | [Owner] |
Observation. Of [n] leaver events sampled in the window, [n] showed access removal after the target period, and [n] retained active entitlements in [system] at the time of testing. Revocation depends on the line manager raising a ticket rather than on a feed from the HR system of record.
Risk. Departed personnel retain the ability to authenticate to systems processing [data class]. This is the documented root cause of prior-year observation [ref], which was closed on the basis of a manual checklist rather than a control change.
Evidence examined. HR termination extract for the window; provisioning tool ticket history; directory account status export; interview with [role] on [date].
Recommendation. Establish the HR system as the authoritative trigger, with automated disablement at termination effective date and revocation of application entitlements within the target period. Retain the manual path as an exception route only, logged and reviewed monthly.
Interim compensating control. Weekly reconciliation of HR terminations against active accounts, evidenced and signed by [role], until automation is live.
Evidence this will produce once implemented. Timestamped disablement records per termination, exception log with approvals, and a monthly reconciliation report — sufficient for SOX walkthrough, SOC 2 sampling and NYDFS review without additional preparation.
| WINDOW | WORKSTREAM | CLOSES | DEPENDENCY |
|---|---|---|---|
| Weeks 1–4 | HR-triggered leaver automation; MFA exception expiry enforced | F-02, F-06 | HR data quality sign-off |
| Weeks 3–10 | Entitlement discovery and role catalogue with business sign-off | F-01 | Business owner availability |
| Weeks 6–12 | Just-in-time privileged elevation; standing entitlements removed | F-03, F-07 | Change freeze calendar |
| Weeks 10–16 | SoD ruleset enforced at request; non-human identity lifecycle | F-04, F-05 | Role catalogue complete |
| Weeks 14–18 | Evidence pack assembly and control-owner rehearsal | All | Audit calendar |
A line-by-line list of every artefact requested, the date received, and the items outstanding at report date. Outstanding items are stated explicitly rather than omitted, so the reader can see the boundary of the conclusions.
Named recipients and their roles; interview log with role, date and topics covered.
A fixed-scope identity and access assessment runs two to six weeks depending on estate size, and produces this report, a findings register your internal audit function can adopt, and a costed remediation roadmap. Senior-led under a statement of work.
Talk to a practice lead: info@aceitsolutions.ai · +1 (650) 606-5553
© 2026 ACE IT Solutions. ACE IT Solutions — an Autharva company. Template document with illustrative content; it describes no real client, engagement or finding. An assessment is not an audit and does not constitute an attestation or certification opinion. Certification is granted solely by accredited certification bodies.